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Abstract
This paper explores the possibility that monitoring resources explain the clus-
tering in space of aggregate FDI from the same source country. Theoretically, the
paper shows that independently of any institutional incentive setting, costly monitor-
ing incites headquarters to locate new plants where monitoring resources are relatively
cheap. Clustering of rms from the same source country is therefore interpreted as
information sourcing. Empirical application nds that the importance of geographic
neighbors to the location choice of US non-manufacturing FDI in Europe conform to
the advanced hypothesis.
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11 Introduction
The study of cross-host countries eects in the pattern of ows of foreign direct invest-
ments is quite recent. While the extant FDI literature contends that direct investment
location decisions are based on characteristics proper to the host country, several recent
studies in economic geography reveal that the eects of various agglomeration externalities
and spillovers are crucial in explaining FDI location. These studies emphasize proximity
among rms as an important factor in the process of transmission of externalities between
foreign and local rms. Empirically, these contributions indicate that in dierent countries
FDI tends to cluster in certain regions and new ows of investments are likely to be closer
to old ones. In eect, the clustering of rms with horizontal or vertical relationship, gen-
erates productivity and wage spillovers that operate through various channels1. Drawing
upon this literature, this paper explores the possibility that spillovers justify the clustering
in space of FDI from the same source country.
Current FDI literature addresses issues related to proximity around two majors concerns.
First, many authors question whether and when spillovers to local economy occur. The
conventional analysis, outlined by Blomstrm and Kokko (1996), for instance, suggests
that technology and managerial skill spillovers can be realized when local rms invest
in new tools and procedures. It follows that FDI incentives motivated by expectations
of spillovers to local rms should be accompanied by nancial and technical preparation
of those rms (Blomstrm and Kokko, 2003, 1996). Second, the literature questions the
motives of multinational rms when they locate closer to existing rms. Building on the
work of Marshall (1960), various contributions emphasize positive agglomeration eects
resulting from the clustering of rms. They suggest that agglomeration eects attract new
investments (Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Love, 2003). Love (2003) suggested for example
that new rms might be sourcing technology, therefore locating close to leading research
centers in areas where the source country is relatively less skilled, with the hope of ab-
sorbing learning spillovers. However, empirical investigation of this claim produced mixed
results. Drield and Munday (2000) did not nd evidence of such behavior in a panel of
1See Lipsey (2002)for an extensive review of literature on FDI spillovers within the host country
2FDI in the United Kingdom (UK) manufacturing industry. They concluded that prot
seeking motivates location of new rms, even when close to older rms. Nevertheless,
Branstetter (2001) suggested that technology sourcing motivated the increase in Japanese
investments in the US in the second half of 1980. However, even in this case, sourcing of
spillovers beneted only rms located in the same country. Attempts to study interde-
pendence of foreign direct investments ows or stock across neighboring countries, have
been limited to the role that economic integration plays in the increase in FDI received by
member countries (Neary, 2002; Balasubramanyam, Sapsford, and Griths, 2002; Girma,
2002).
Economics and statistics motives suggest that in analyzing FDI the actual treatment of
interdependence between outows or between stocks is incomplete. From an economic
standpoint, even in the absence of economic integration2 among countries, three motives
may create cross-country interdependence of stock and ows of FDI. First, the ability
of countries to attract FDI can be related to their geographic location, because natural
resources endowments, geophysical shocks, and epidemics cause correlation of outows to
geographic neighbors (Weinhold, 2002). Second, the presence of multinational corporations
(MNC) creates externalities that cannot be fully internalized (Lipsey, 2002). For example,
local rms can either replicate an MNCs knowledge and technology without additional cost,
or can face sti competition that forces them to nd ways to survive3. At any rate, limiting
replication of technology or competition to a single country seems to be against accepted
ideas of propagation of skills and knowledge across countries (Lucas, 1990; Krugman,
1991). Unless the MNC adopts preventive measures to reduce spillovers, neighbors of the
host country could also benet from knowledge and technology spillovers from the MNC4
to them. Third, and nally due to the strong prot-seeking motive for FDI a high GDP
is a great motivation to attract new ows of FDI. The economic growth literature argues
that GDP growth rates are correlated across countries (Conley and Ligon, 2002; Weinhold,
2European Integration is a possible reason that Portugal, Ireland, and Spain have recently emerged as
second best locations for new ows of total investment. See, for example, Barry (2003).
3See Blomstrm and Kokko (1996) for the channels of transmission of spillovers
4Branstetter (2001), shows that for Japanese and US rms, intra-national knowledge spillovers are more
important in scope. He, however, does not rule out the existence of international spillovers. Also see Keller
(2004) for the idea of MNC preventing the diusion of technology
32002). Growth rate correlation is generally explained by similar macroeconomic shocks
in aggregate trade and investments. Similarity of shocks supposes possible correlation of
inows of investment. The hypothesis in this paper is that correlation of FDI ows may
arise because information contained in US investment stock in a country encourages new
investment ows to its neighbors. From a statistical standpoint, if there is dependence
between ows or between stocks of FDI across neighboring countries, spillovers may be
present and may lead to bias in an analysis based only on a host country's characteristics.
Figures 1 and 2 display such pattern of autocorrelation around the world in FDI from the
US and Japan.
This paper departs from existing FDI literature in two ways. First, the paper introduces
a model for FDI location under information asymmetry. Current analysis of spillovers is
presented as technology diusion or market size eects from the ownership internalization
and location (OLI) literature. The usual presentation is an extension of the non formal
pull and push approach to capital ows. This is, to our knowledge, the rs attempt to
model aggregate ows in an information asymmetry perspective. Second the paper applies
the model to aggregate ows from the United States. Thus, spillovers across countries
are explicitly introduced as a determinant of foreign direct investment. The traditional
capital ow perspective justies ows by prots and factor costs considerations within
the host country. To the best of our knowledge, there is no clear attempt to question the
importance of capital ows to third countries in the aggregate ows literature. Attempts in
the OLI literature have considered market size motive and prot seeking motives stemming
from third countries (Baltagi, Egger, and Pfaermayr, 2008, 2007). They do not, however,
consider the inuence of the presence of rms in neighboring countries. In this study
the signicant inuence of neighbors stocks of investment will suggest that there may
be a bias in previous research. Countries can also view their geographical proximity to
leading investment centers as a possible reason to be an alternate investment location
(complementary or substitute location). The use of panel data technique in this paper
allows us to work around endogeneity problems that are frequent in cross section analysis.
It will also be possible to capture the magnitude of the importance of the spatial variable
(neighbor's variable) as a determinant of FDI. Finally, using manufacturing and non-
manufacturing FDI as alternate dependent variables help improve our understanding of
4spillovers.
After a brief literature review (Section 2), a model for FDI location under information
asymmetry is developed(Section 3). An empirical estimation of the derived equation tests
the importance of neighbors' stock investments of foreign direct investment in Section 4.
Section 5 concludes the paper and derives some implications of the study.
2 Neighbor's Eects in the FDI Literature
Within the current dominant paradigm, where FDI is explained by ownership, location,
and internalization (Dunning, 1988), it is admitted that the presence of a Multinational
Corporation (MNC) aects local rms through productivity and wage spillover.
Productivity spillovers arise because ownership advantages attached to tangible and in-
tangible assets are easily transferable and can be replicated at low cost. Policymakers
nd the presence of MNC attractive because they expect advantages to spillover to local
rms. Blomstrm and Kokko (1996); Lipsey (2002); Keller (2004, 2002) support this opin-
ion. Wage spillovers, on the other hand, arise when the presence of a multinational aects
the average wage rate in the country5. There are mixed views in the literature on wage
spillovers.
Current FDI literature explores three main channels through which the presence of an
MNC improves the productivity of local rms: linkages among rms (vertical and hor-
izontal, backward and forward) as well as competition and technology. First, regarding
linkages between foreign and local rms, spillovers can happen in horizontal relationships,
such as technology transfers, training, and demonstration eect within one industry; and
in vertical relationships, supply or demand contacts between the MNC and local rms
incite similar transfer. For example, Love (2003) reported that defections from an MNC
contributed to production eciency of domestic industries in Mexico. He did not report,
however, the characteristics of the rms hiring trained workers or their locations with re-
5See Lipsey (2002) for a literature review of international diusion of technology through FDI and
through exports
5spect to the MNC.
Second, regrading competition, the presence of foreign rms may aect the cost struc-
ture of local rms through factor price eects, and through the quality of hired work-
ers.Nevertheless, an important branch of this literature insists that the overall eect of the
presence of an MNC for local rms is negative (Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Djankov and Hoekman,
2000; Haddad and Harrison, 1993).
Third, regarding technology spillover, the hypothesis is that through all relationships taken
together (observation, demonstration eect, hiring of trained workers, backward and for-
ward relationships), knowledge and technology spillovers to local rms are achieved. Em-
pirically, Branstetter (2001) found such evidence in the increase in the ow of knowledge
spillovers to and from Japanese rms in the US. Yeaple (2003) also found evidence of
technology spillovers in developed countries. Nonetheless, other studies report the lack of
evidence of productivity spillovers in developing countries and question the direction of
spillovers when agglomeration exists (Haddad and Harrison, 1993). Blomstrm and Kokko
(1996) argued that in most countries local rms needed the capacity to benet from
spillovers, thus the pattern of knowledge and technology transmission needed clear deni-
tion. To this eect Javorcik (2004) adds that the existence of spillovers is associated with
shared ownership of the multinational aliate.
The issue of the direction of spillovers is still contentious. If foreign to domestic spillovers
depends on the preparation of local rms, and happens within uncertain geographic range,
domestic to foreign spillovers is still a possibility that depends on the relative technologi-
cal intensities of the source and host nations (Pearce, 1999; Serapio Jr. and Dalton, 1999;
Love and Lage-Hidalgo, 2000; Love, 2003). The evidence so far is that foreign rm are at-
tracted by agglomeration eects in general (e.g., trained workers and consumers), and the
possibility of technology sourcing. In this respect, some studies report that in technology
intensive industries inward FDI from countries with relatively less technology, tended to
locate closer to rms of the same industry (Drield and Munday, 2000; Love, 2003). They
are however cautious in concluding that these were clear cases of technology sourcing.
Empirical evidence on wage spillovers is more mixed. While high wages paid by multi-
national companies may not always increase the average wage level in the manufacturing
industry ?? the average level of wages paid by all local rms may increase as in Lipsey
6(2002). Girma (2002) specically tested for wage spillovers to domestic rms in their UK
company data set for 1991-96 and found no overall spillover eect on wage levels nor a
lower negative eect on wage growth (p. 128). However, in a cross section of Indonesian
manufacturing data Lipsey and Sjholm (2004) found that the presence of foreign rm sig-
nicantly raises the average wage paid by local rms (which is evidence of spillover).
In conclusion, spillovers happen through technology and wages. Evidence on both types of
spillovers is relatively mixed. However productivity spillovers are more likely to happen.
Whether these spillovers diuse to neighboring countries is not clearly considered, if the
usual hypothesis is that intranational spillovers are more important (Branstetter, 2001).
To be clear, most of the literature admits the existence of some form of international
connection between countries. Diusion of technology occurs through exports (Keller,
2004; Branstetter, 2001) as consequence of globalization, in general, Marshall (1960), re-
sulting from returns to scale, economic and regional concentration, transportation costs,
and knowledge spillovers (Krugman and Venables, 1995, 1993). According to the location
theory of Braunerhjelm and Svensson (1996) regions with relatively more foreign estab-
lishments are more likely to attract additional investments as in Swedish high-tech rms
in OECD countries in countries that specialize in similar production. Wheeler and Mody
(1992) have a similar idea of regional concentration at the rm level when they show that
during the period 1982-1988 in a panel of 42 countries the presence of many other foreign
rms in a region mattered signicantly as a determinant of new FDI inows.
The perspective in this study is based on ows of capital (equity, reinvested earnings, inter-
company debt)irrespective of institutional arrangements, and constitutes a microeconomic
approach to aggregate FDI data. Moreover, this study considers two sources of agglom-
eration eects. The rst source is the presence of past investments in the host country.
The second source is the presence of foreign investments in neighboring countries. This
study attempts to show that locational characteristics, dened as existence of monitoring
resources, are likely to not only drive ows into areas dense in FDI stock, but also to
drive new FDI to the outskirts of the area, where they may benet from high relative
protability over time.
73 Multinational Approach to Neighbors' Eects
Unlike traditional models that associate a measure of FDI to host country characteristics
only,(Barrell and Pain, 1996; Love, 2003; Bajo-Rubio and Sosvilla-Rivero, 1994), or in-
clude a third country in a non formal manner in an OLI perspective (Baltagi et al., 2008,
2007; Blonigen, Davies, Waddell, and Naughton, 2007), this paper formally uses imperfect
information to justify the use of resources outside the host country. Information asymme-
try has been used to show the superiority of FDI over hiring a local contractor in the host
country (Markusen, Maskus, and Str, 2002).6 The principal (the investor in the source
country) may use available resources in a third country to improve monitoring the agent
(The FDI recipient whose main function is to attract FDI and in return, produces output
for the principal). Obviously, there is information asymmetry between the principal and
his local agent because the principal cannot completely monitor the behavior of his agent7.
Under these circumstances, the output level from which prots are derived is uncertain.
The principal can either devise ecient ows of FDI to motivate agents to produce the
level of output that maximizes prots or spend additional resources to monitor the agents.
The idea developed in this model is that, to obtain a prot maximizing production level,
the corresponding cost function should reect the design of incentives that motivate e-
cient eorts from the agent. The model is rst explored in a regular cost minimization
under constraint including information cost, then the theoretical expectations of the model
are conrmed in the principal agent framework.
For a multinational producing a homogeneous product at home and abroad, the prot
derived from sales and maintenance activities, or manufacturing activities is:
 = TR   TC (1)
6However, since FDI implies relatively high level of control dened by most institutions as above 10
percent ownership, it does not mean total ownership and leaves room for strategic behavior from local
partners in the host country.
7Markusen et al. (2002) developed FDI models with information asymmetry where the principal can
either hire a local contractor or set up his own aliate. These models compare the relative eciency of the
two strategies in one period and in many periods and assess the timing and opportunity of FDI decisions.
8TR are revenues from sales at home and abroad, TC is the total cost associated with
production, with the total revenue TR given by:
TR = P1(X1)X1 + P2(X2)X2 (2)
where P1 is the price in the home market, P2 is the price in the foreign market, X1 is the
sales in the home market, X2 is the sales in the foreign market. If production is carried
out abroad, and there is information asymmetry, production abroad is given by:
Q2 = ff(L2;F;e;N) (3)
Where, L2 is labor needed for production abroad, F is physical factors abroad funded by
FDI, e is eort needed for positive production, correlated with headquarters monitoring,
N represents other resources not funded by FDI.
The multinational motivates agents' eorts by continually using extra resources. Monitor-
ing is necessary because headquarters have a partial control over the production process,
but they stand to lose their investment if the agent's eort is not enough to provide
sucient returns. This idea is consistent with the denition of FDI (more than 10% own-
ership), and with the characterization of usual risks associated with investing in a foreign
country (?). The unit cost of monitoring eort is r. The total expenditure on eorts is
re = R (4)
Assuming that activities abroad also raise the level of demand, foreign prices can be written
as P2(X2;Q2). Maximizing shareholders net worth, (equivalent to maximizing prots) is
therefore written as:
 = P1(X1)X1 + P2(X2;Q2)X2   TC(Q1)   TC2(Q2)   (X1 + X2   Q1   Q2) (5)
With prices denominated in common currency. The equivalent cost minimization problem
9is
Min : TC = TC1 + TC2 (6)
With
TC1 = w1L1 + c1K1 (7)
and
TC2 = w2L2 + c2fF + c2nN + r2e (8)
Where w2 is the unit cost of labor in the foreign country, c2f is the per unit cost of physical
capital funded by FDI, c2n is the per unit cost of non labor resources funded by borrowing
on the local market, r2 is the per unit cost of agents eorts.
The lagrangian can be written as:
L = w1L1+c1K+w2L2+c2fF +c2nN+r2e+(Q1+Q2 fl(K1;L1) ff(L2;F;N;e)) (9)
With rst order conditions:
@L
@L1
: w1   MPL1 = 0 (10)
@L
@L2
: w2   MPL2 = 0 (11)
@L
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: Q1 + Q2   f(K1;L1)   f(L2;F;e;N) (15)







Under information asymmetry it should be costly to motivate eort from the agent abroad
thus we should have r2 > 0. It should be noted that free information would revert the
problem back to the usual optimization framework with perfect information, which would
unrealistically associate clustering in space of investment to absence of information friction.
Positive information externalities which can be translated into negative information costs
can also theoretically increase the ows of investments from other rms in locations close
enough to the host country. The framework here supposes only investment from rms
originating from the same source and locating aliates in neighboring locations.
Assuming positive investments (F > 0) we can have c2F > 0 : two situations become
consistent with r2 > 0
Proposition 1







11as long as the second order conditions for cost minimization are met, it would be un-
derstandable that the MNC headquarters accept to purchase information with r2 > 0
.
Proposition 2







Assuming that the rst order conditions for cost minimization are met, and following the
constraint of positive per unit cost of information, we are left with negative shadow costs
of information (  0), which can be seen as producing more would increase the amount
of information. It results that having r2 > 0 does not ensure
@f
@e > 0, but headquarters
with readily available production capacity would be in better position to monitor and elicit
higher eort from the agent.
For consistency, let's examine the problem from an incentive design angle: from the multi-
national perspective, expenses abroad E are made of explicit FDI resources F and moni-
toring resources designed to elicit eort level e.
E = c2FF + r2e (19)
As previously agreed, setting r2 = 0 or r2 < 0 are both equal to situations not discussed






Where  is the probability of shirking, and   is a coecient of visibility, that depends on
12available monitoring resources in the neighborhood of the investment.




From the agent's perspective, assuming that the agent is interested in extra ows of FDI,
the incentive compatibility constraint can be written as:
F   k(e)  FP (22)
Where FP is the private satisfactory level of investment to the agent, k is the private cost
of the agent when he produces e.
Because we assume that the agent has the advantage of private information on his eort,
it is logical to consider the cost of eort to the agent to be less than the cost to the
multinational
r2 > k (23)
Under uncertainty about shirking, the multinational investment abroad is given by the
expected value of investment level. However, investment abroad is viable only if the
motivation of the agent matches the motivation of the headquarters.
F   k(e)  F0 + (1   )F (24)
with F0  0 being the penalty ow level of FDI. If e = 0, then
F = F0 + (1   )F (25)
at the cost k(0). Therefore there will be no additional investments. Assuming that the
13agent sets nonzero minimal eort e 6= 0, we can write
F   k(e)  F0 + F   F (26)
k(e)  (F   F0) (27)




(F   F0) (28)
With F  F0 > 0 and  









(F   F0) (29)
Which shows that, given r2 and (F  F0) > 0, higher   increases the upper margin of
@f
@e.
We conclude that given a per-unit cost of eort r2, extra factors improving the visibility
of headquarters  , increase the marginal contribution of the eort of the agent to rm's
prots. There is an inverse relationship between the marginal cost of e and  .   can
therefore be used to construct a good proxy for the unobservable cost of e to be used in
the cost minimization problem.
The cost minimization problem can be implicitly solved for endogenous variables, Q1,Q2,
X1,X2,L1,L2,K1,K2 and F in term of exogenous variables only. Thus, F can be written
as:
F = f(c;w;c2N;c2F; ) (30)
F can be further modied in various usual ways adopted in the FDI literature. This
includes using the relationship between optimal factor ratio and factor price ratio, using
composite capital cost to account for exchange rate depreciation and capital control regu-
lations (Barrell and Pain, 1996). Inclusion of total demand (D) and corporate prots(PR)
are also ways to augment the model with additional market seeking drivers. Implicitly,












RER denotes the one period rate of change in the dollar real exchange rate, PR is the
real level of US corporate prots. D is the total demand, and   is
P
i6=j
wijFj the total stock
of investment in neighboring countries.
Furthermore, equation (31) can be interpreted as an equation for the desired level of FDI.
That is because delivery lags delay nding suitable investment abroad and delay obtaining


















Since we are concerned with ows of FDI, we use the partial adjustment process, usual in
the FDI literature to isolate ows (Barrell and Pain, 1996; Love, 2003)
Ft   Ft 1 = (F
t   Ft 1) (33)
where  is a distributed lag function, and nally,
It = (F
t   Ft 1) (34)




















Assuming a linear relationship, the above equation can be transformed into an empirically
testable form as follows:
Iit = Xit + Ft 1 + '
X
i6=i
wijFjt 1 + "t (36)
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where Xt is the matrix of usual determinants of foreign FDI, the variable with coecient
 represents the persistence in the ows of FDI, and the variable with coecient ' is the
spatial eect that captures geographic spillovers.
4 Data and Empirical Methodology
Equation (36) can be rewritten as
FDIit = 0 + 1Dit + 2DISTit + 3C2Fit + 4wit + 5RERit +
6DUMit + 7PRit + Fit 1 + '  + "t
FDIit is the annual ow of FDI (in millions of dollars) from the US to country i at
year t, used here as endogenous variable. FDI data were obtained from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA). FDI ows are, in fact, the sum of equity capital, inter-
company debt, and reinvested earnings. For consistency in cross country comparison, the
conception of FDI in this paper is consistent with the denition of FDI in the International
Monetary Fund's (IMF) 5th balance of payment manual. This approach is standard in the
macro-view perspective of FDI analysis (Love, 2003; Barrell and Pain, 1996). FDI in the
manufacturing sector (FDIMA) and FDI in the non-manufacturing sectors (FDINMA) are
also considered as alternate endogenous variables.
16Explicative variables comprise 8 variables obtained from various sources. First,GDPit is
the GDP of country i at year t. It represents the size of the market in the host country.
GDP data is obtained from the IMF. Second, DISTit is distance between Washington,
DC and the capital city of country i (the host country). Distance data are obtained from
www.indo.com, where calculations are done using the Geod program available from the
US Geological survey. Third, COSTKit is the dierential cost of capital between the
US and the host country i at year t. COSTK is computed following Love (2003) and




)  (r + 0:10   1) (39)
where Kd is the gross xed capital formation deator, GDPd is the gross domestic product
deator, and r the medium run nominal interest rate. Data on Kd, GDPd and r are
obtained from the IMF. Depreciation rate by assumption is 0 and 1 is the rate of change
in Kd one year ahead. Fourth, COSTLit is the relative cost of labor in the host country.
COSTL is dened as the ratio of host country wages to US wages in dollar per hour, as
published in the International Labor Oce yearbook. Sixth, CHERit is one period change
in the real exchange rate between the country i currency and the US dollar at year t. The





where En is the host country's nominal exchange rate in dollars, Pd is host country's price
deator, USPPI is US producer price index. All necessary data are obtained from the






is the spatial lag of FDI stock representing neighbors inuence. Where Fij is the stock of
17investment in all the j's countries in a 1000 miles radius from a country i. Stock of FDI
carries the idea of spillovers that builds over time
The annual data used in this study span the period 1982 to 2000. Summary statistics for
the data are provided in Table 1.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
We applied the panel data estimation technique to the following model:
Iit = Xit + Ft 1 + '  + "t (42)
where "it = i + it
Stocks of investments are dened as cumulative ows and can be written as
Ft 1 = It 1 + Ft 2 (43)
Using (43), we can rewrite (42) as follows:
Iit = 1It 1 + Xit + 2Ft 2 + '
X
i6=i
wFjt 1 + "t (44)
where Ft 1 = 1It 1 + 2Ft 2
which is a dynamic equation with the spatial term  . Nickell (1981) argued that in
dynamic equations, two basic econometric problems are created by the presence of a lagged
dependent variable among the regressors: 1) the autocorrelation of the error term with
the lagged dependent variable, and 2) heterogeneity. Nickell (1981) added that, usual
panel data techniques are not appropriate because biased and inconsistent estimates will
occur. However, as the sample size increases, the bias generated by the presence of a
lagged dependent will grow smaller. Moreover, the presence of the spatial term creates
18an additional complication. The specication supposes substantive spatial dependence.8
Where the structure of the dependence is captured by the neighbors stock of investment.
Two major estimation techniques are generally used to avoid the estimation problem
discussed above. The Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimation technique, which is
more ecient, and the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) estimator, which is more consistent
(Kiviet, 1995).
Arellano and Bond dynamic panel data estimation technique is used for estimation of the
equations in the next section.
5 Empirical results
Table 2 shows the regression results. All variables are instrumented by the lag level of
the regressors, following the Arellano and Bond (1991) dynamic panel data estimation
procedure. The coecient of the spatial term reects shocks (accumulated over time)
to neighboring countries that help attract FDI in the host country. Because the spatial
variable is a stock of ows accumulated over time, it is fair to suggest that it carries the
idea of spillovers that naturally take time to integrate into the host country's economy.
Moreover, it can be logically considered to be the extent to which investing in the host
country is an alternative to investing in neighboring countries. Two main conclusions
can be derived from the regressions below. First, the coecient of the spatial term is
positive and signicant. Thus, controlling for the host country's characteristics, shocks to
neighboring countries positively aect FDI to the host country. Second, after introduction
of the variable representing the neighbor's inuence, the country SIZE coecient becomes
negative and non-signicant. This means that the host country size is less important
when the country is integrated with its neighbors. This result is consistent with prior
studies that show that the size of the regional market is more relevant than the size
of the host country market to investment in Europe (Braunerhjelm and Svensson, 1996;
Barrell and Pain, 1996; Baltagi et al., 2007).
8Anselin, Florax, and Rey (2004)
19[ Insert Table 2. Full Sample Arellano and Bond Fixed Eect Regression of FDI about
here]
When restricting the analysis to ows of FDI in the non-manufacturing sector, as shown
in Table 3, the two conclusions in the regressions above still hold. Stock of investment
in geographically neighboring countries has a positive impact on the host country's new
ows of FDI. This relationship is (exactly as above) valid when the distance between the
host country and the neighbor is at most 1000 miles. The country SIZE coecient is
positive and non-signicant when controlling only for home country characteristics and
when including the neighbor's inuence. Furthermore, the country SIZE coecient is
negative and signicant when an additional control variable is introduced to capture the
fact the country has received investments in the past.
[Insert Table 3. Full Sample Arrellano and Bond Fixed Eect Regression of FDI non-
manufacturing, about here]
Table 4 shows results of three regressions where the dependent variable is restricted to ows
of foreign investment directed to the manufacturing sector. The main result is that the two
conclusions above no longer hold true. Geographical neighbors do not have a statistically
signicant impact on new ows of investments in the host country, and contrary to the case
of non-manufacturing investments, the country SIZE coecient is positive and signicant.
This suggests that manufacturing investments may be less likely to diuse to neighboring
countries.
[ Insert Table 4. Full sample Arrellano and Bond xed eect regression of FDI Manufac-
turing about here]
Thus, when spillover is dened as a process by which a neighboring countrys stock of
investments inuences new ows of investments to the host country, US FDI decisions in
general seem to be inuenced by prior knowledge of the neighboring country. However, this
behavior only occurs when ows are directed to the non-manufacturing sector. Performing
regressions on other specic regions gives similar results (available from the author upon
20request).
6 Conclusion
The eects of neighboring countries on new ows of FDI to a host country can be mod-
eled using geographical spillovers stemming from monitoring resources outside the host
country. Estimating an equation derived from the model shows that when the neighbor
lies within a 1000 miles of the host country, US FDI depends globally upon the amount
of information about the neighborhood of the investment location collected over time.
However, this conclusion does not hold true when investments to only the manufacturing
sector are considered. It seems that the geographical spillover from information costs fos-
ters investments to neighboring countries in the non-manufacturing sector only. This may
be due to the use of manufacturing investments regional supply platform. Further analysis
may however be needed to understand the full scope of the behavior of traditional FDI
determinants in this model.
This study shows that although US FDI is globally dependent upon the amount of in-
formation on the neighborhood of the investment location collected over time, there is a
heterogeneous response to the importance of neighbors depending on the aectation of the
FDI as manufacturing or non-manufacturing.
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24Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
regi 3 0 475
ID 30 14.807 475
Year 1991 5.483 475
RER 349.754 3220.086 423
costl 1.442 2.993 245
uscostl 2.676 0.18 475
gdp 10.242 1.22 427
costk 0.635 1.428 294
uscostk -0.606 1.699 450
rmprot 4.349 0.889 302
bodrinv 11.061 1.713 473
dist 8.381 0.168 475
fdi 6.112 1.86 321
fdiman 4.987 1.884 328
fdinma 5.695 1.856 290
chrer -4.969 2.427 135
population 2.632 1.276 455
stockin 8.039 1.641 423
relativwag 0.531 1.138 245
relativcosk 0.581 18.907 277
gdpcapita 3.765 2.8 427
difcostl 1.241 2.976 245
difcosk -1.202 1.562 277
relativesize 113.897 24.41 425
relativesize2 28.887 14.464 453
25Table 2: Cross-correlations




fdiman 0.686 0.306 1.000
(0.000) (0.020)
gdp 0.323 0.320 0.221 1.000
(0.014) (0.015) (0.099)
dist -0.199 -0.324 -0.034 -0.268 1.000
(0.138) (0.014) (0.802) (0.043)
costk -0.119 -0.101 -0.182 0.031 -0.053 1.000
(0.378) (0.453) (0.175) (0.817) (0.693)
costl 0.365 0.344 0.245 0.100 -0.236 -0.213 1.000
(0.005) (0.009) (0.066) (0.457) (0.077) (0.112)
chrer 0.190 0.227 0.054 -0.244 -0.078 -0.075 0.538 1.000
(0.156) (0.089) (0.692) (0.067) (0.566) (0.582) (0.000)
rmprot 0.452 0.341 0.368 0.166 -0.153 -0.485 0.263 -0.015 1.000
(0.000) (0.009) (0.005) (0.216) (0.255) (0.000) (0.048) (0.910)
bodrinv 0.289 0.299 0.265 0.011 -0.680 -0.102 0.051 0.066 0.257 1.000
(0.029) (0.024) (0.046) (0.934) (0.000) (0.451) (0.709) (0.628) (0.053)
relativcosk -0.106 -0.064 -0.079 0.083 -0.167 -0.540 0.046 -0.116 -0.031 0.086 1.000
(0.431) (0.636) (0.560) (0.541) (0.214) (0.000) (0.732) (0.390) (0.819) (0.523)
relativwag 0.353 0.342 0.229 0.112 -0.238 -0.189 0.998 0.533 0.227 0.032 0.053 1.000
(0.007) (0.009) (0.087) (0.409) (0.075) (0.158) (0.000) (0.000) (0.089) (0.815) (0.697)
relativesize 0.400 0.400 0.345 0.428 -0.711 -0.084 0.086 -0.009 0.298 0.905 0.113 0.073 1.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.001) (0.000) (0.532) (0.525) (0.945) (0.024) (0.000) (0.403) (0.590)
relativesize2 0.178 0.152 0.267 0.720 -0.465 0.043 -0.120 -0.223 0.060 0.437 0.131 -0.115 0.714 1.000




VARIABLES Base case Augmented 1 Augmented 2




D.dist 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
D.relativcosk 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
D.relativwag -4.67 20.08 -2.83
(11.58) (15.16) (17.54)
D.chrer -0.09 -0.17 -0.08
(0.47) (0.39) (0.64)
D.rmprot 2.99* 4.33*** 3.12*
(1.53) (1.27) (1.89)






Constant 0.55 -0.24 0.68
(0.69) (0.82) (1.15)
Observations 11 11 11
Number of id 5 5 5
ARtest 2 2 2
Sargan 1.985 0.958 1.951
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
27FDINMA Regression results
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Base case Augmented 1 Augmented 2




D.dist 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
D.relativcosk 0.03 0.03 0.03
(.) (.) (.)
D.relativwag -1.39 0.00 0.00
(.) (0.00) (0.00)
D.chrer -2.39 -2.32 -2.32
(.) (.) (.)
D.rmprot 2.63 2.77 2.77
(.) (.) (.)






Constant -0.40 -0.32 -0.32
(.) (.) (.)
Observations 7 7 7
Number of id 4 4 4
ARtest 2 2 2
Sargan -2 -3 -2
Standard errors in parentheses






















Number of id 5
ARtest 2
Sargan 0.995
Standard errors in parentheses












Figure 2: Japan FDI in the world
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